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Abstract
This paper considers a risk-neutral agricultural producer who faces
two correlated risks: a risk on the level of output and a risk on the price
of the output. It shows a case in which the value of information about
the risk on output always increases with the coeﬃcient of correlation
(in absolute value) between the two risks, but it also shows a case
where it may decrease with this coeﬃcient.
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11 Introduction
In modern ﬁnancial theory as in many other branches of economics or deci-
sion sciences, the ability to cope with situations involving multiple risks has
represented a major progress (see, e.g., Gollier, 2001). Quite surprisingly the
literature on the value of information - whether theoretical or applied - has
been mostly developed under the assumption that the decision-maker faces
a single source of risk.
In this paper, we consider a model with multiple risks and we examine the
eﬀect of the statistical correlation between these risks on the value of informa-
tion. Intuitively, this eﬀect should be positive. Indeed when the correlation
(in absolute value) between two risks increases, receiving information on one
of them oﬀers indirectly a partial increase of information on the other risk.
This suggests that one piece of information has more value since it reduces
the ex post variance of two risks (a consequence of the Blackwell (1951)’s
theorem), and not only that of one risk. Hence, one expects the value of
information to increase with the correlation (in absolute value) between two
risks. We show that this intuition is basically correct but that it does not
account for the full relationship between correlation and information value.
In fact, we specify a case where the intuition is fully satisﬁed and we identify
a case where it is either incomplete or even wrong.
While our paper is mostly theoretical, it may have empirical implications.
Consider for instance weather forecasts. Their value is most of the time
determined through the information they yield on the future random output
assuming the other elements of the decision-makers’ environment are known
with certainty (Adams et al., 1995, Bontems and Thomas, 2000, Chavas et
al., 1991, Mjelde et al., 1998). However, a favorable climate not only raises
t h er e a l i z e do u t p u tf o rm o s tp r o d u c e r sa b o v ei t sp l a n n e dl e v e lb u ti ta l s o
puts a downward pressure on the market price since a majority of producers
in a given area are aﬀected in the same way. Hence a weather forecast
gives not only a direct information on future output but it also gives an
indirect information on future price through the correlation (negative in this
case) between quantities and prices. Because this negative correlation tends
naturally to stabilize total receipts (see, e.g., McKinnon, 1967), it reduces
the risk faced by the agricultural producer which may reduce the value of
information.1 Hence this eﬀect works in the opposite direction of the ﬁrst
1There is no general result on the link between more riskiness and information value,
2general positive eﬀect described earlier.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we describe
the model and its implications under quite general conditions. The following
two sections are devoted to speciﬁc cases in order to better illustrate the
forces at work. For instance, we analyze in section 4 the benchmark case of
additive output risk. In this case, only the positive general eﬀect is present
a n di ty i e l d san i c es y m m e t r i cr e l a t i o n s hip between the degree of correlation
and information value. In section 5, we turn to the more realistic case of a
multiplicative output risk where we observe a lack of symmetry between the
degree of correlation and information value. The last section concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a risk-neutral mono-product farmer who faces two risks, a risk
on output and a risk on price (see, e.g., McKinnon 1967, Eeckhoudt and
Hansen, 1989). This farmer selects ex ante a single input level x yielding a
random future output q given by
q(x,e ε), (1)
where e ε is a random element (e.g. climate conditions) with Ee ε =0 .A s
is standard, the marginal productivity of x is positive (q1 > 0)a n dn o n
increasing (q11 ≤ 0) for all realizations ofe ε.B yc o n v e n t i o nε has a beneﬁciary
eﬀect on the realized output (q2 > 0) and it may or may not aﬀect the
marginal productivity of x which is reﬂected by the sign of the second cross
partial derivative of q (i.e. q12).
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tm o s tp r o d u c e r so ft h es a m ec r o pa r ea ﬀected in the
same way by the random element e ε they expect that in general the future
unit price of their output will be (negatively) related to e ε so that
e p = p0(1 + ρe ε), (2)
where ρ is the correlation coeﬃcient between perceived price and realized
output and where p0 is the expected price.2 To avoid negative prices we
assume that ε ≥− 1.
except under linearity assumptions of the payoﬀ function (see, e.g., Hess, 1982). This
observation suggests that our result critically depends on the functional form of the payoﬀ
function, as we will show.
2A slightly more general model could have been considered: e p = p0(1 +e η + ρe ε),w h e r e
3Although the story that motivates this model suggests that ρ is negative,
we will consider throughout values of ρ ranging from −1 to +1 in order to
guarantee the generality of the results.3
Given these speciﬁcations and without any information on the realization





[p0(1 + ρε)q(x,ε) − rx]dF(ε), (3)
in which r is the certain unit price of x and F(ε) is the cumulative distribution
of ε.
The ﬁrst and second order conditions (FOC, SOC) for a maximum are
respectively Z +∞
−1





[p0(1 + ρε)q11(x,ε)]dF(ε) < 0. (5)
Note that since (1 + ρε) is never negative q11 < 0 is suﬃcient to satisfy (5).
The optimal solution to (4) will be denoted b x(ρ) showing the dependence








The sign of ∂e x
∂ρ will play an important role later and it is easy to show using
t h eC o v a r i a n c er u l et h a t




Because information value is a diﬀerence between optimal expected proﬁts
with and without information, we introduce the optimal value of x into (3)
e η is independent from e ε and is a zero-mean risk, Ee η =0 .I nt h i sm o d e l ,e v e nw h e nρ =0 ,
there would still be a risk of price (independent from the risk on output). Yet, under
risk-neutrality, only the correlated part of risk of price matters so that we can set e η to its
mean without loss of generality.
3To motivate the possibility of a positive value for ρ,s u p p o s et h a te ε stands for a demand
level with a positive ε indicating an abnormally high level. As a result the price received
by the producer will also be higher resulting in a positive correlation.




[p0(1 + ρε)q(b x(ρ),ε) − rb x(ρ)]dF(ε). (8)
If the decision-maker now receives perfect information on the realization
of e ε before selecting x,4 then for each ε he maximizes
π = p0(1 + ρε)q(x,ε) − rx (9)
yielding the following FOC and SOC
∂π
∂x
= p0(1 + ρε)q1(x,ε) − r =0 , (10)
∂2π
∂x2 ≡ R = p0(1 + ρε)q11(x,ε) < 0. (11)
From (10) it is obvious that with perfect information the optimal x (de-
noted x∗) depends both upon ρ and upon the announced ε. In the next













Notice ﬁr s tt h a tt h es i g no f( 1 2 )i sf u l l yd e t e r m i n e db yt h a to fε.W h e nε
is positive (negative) a larger correlation between the risks leads to a higher
(lower) input demand. As far as (13) is concerned, matters are less easy.
Notice however that if q12 =0 the sign of ∂x∗
∂ε is fully determined by that of
ρ.
To express the expected proﬁt under perfect information (E(e π2)),w e







Using (8) and (14) we will be able in the next section to express the value
of information V and to analyze the impact of ρ on V .
4In order to simplify the notations we limit our analysis to the case of perfect informa-
tion.
53 Information value
Because of the assumption of risk neutrality the concept of information value
is uniquely5 deﬁned by
V = E(e π2) − E(e π1).








∗(ρ,ε),ε) − q(b x(ρ),ε)]dF(ε). (15)
Equation (15) tells us how information value is aﬀected by the correlation
between the risks. Of course, in the case where information does not aﬀect
decisions, i.e. x∗ = b x, the value of information is zero and this sign is zero as







where h(ε) is the diﬀerence between the two output levels q(x∗(ρ,ε),ε) −
















∗,ε) − q2(b x,ε)]. (16)
Since q1 is always positive the sign of the ﬁrst term on the right hand
side of (16) is entirely determined by that of ∂x∗
∂ε (see equation (13) and the
associated comment).
The second term - the one in brackets - is also sign ambiguous. Its sign is
determined by that of q12 and the relative values of x∗ and b x. Notice however
that if q12 =0the expression in brackets is zero since q2 is not inﬂuenced
by the level of x. It thus appears that without further speciﬁcation on the
production function it is extremely diﬃcult to sign ∂h
∂ε. T h i si sw h yi nt h e
next two sections we consider speciﬁc cases in which the sign of ∂h
∂ε and hence
that of ∂V
∂ρ can be analyzed and discussed.
5Under risk aversion, there are at least three possible deﬁnitions of the value of infor-
mation (La Vallée, 1968). Here, these are all equivalent.
64 An additive production risk
In order to better characterize the impact of ρ on V ,w ec o n s i d e rﬁrst the case
where the production risk is additive. Besides in order to obtain closed form
solutions, we specify further the production function so that in the absence






1/2 + ε) − rx]dF(ε). (17)


















where σ2 ≡ Ee ε
2.B e c a u s ep r o ﬁts are convex in ε, we obtain without surprise
that E(e π1) is monotonically increasing in ρ.I n d e e d w h e n ρ increases, the
variability of the proﬁts increases and since proﬁts are convex in ε, E(e π1)
increases with ρ.
When the producer receives perfect information on ε,i ti se a s yt os h o w




























Quite interestingly, V is here a perfectly symmetric function of ρ (as shown
in ﬁgure 1) with a minimum value at ρ =0 .
Insert Figure 1
At ρ =0 , V =0because of the additive nature of the production risk.
When ρ is diﬀerent from zero, obtaining perfect information on the produc-
tion risk indirectly oﬀers partial information on the price risk. Since it is
valuable to have joint information on two risks, V becomes strictly positive.
Notice also that V monotonically increases with ρ (expressed in absolute
term) which conﬁrms the basic intuition described in the introduction. In
the additive case only one eﬀect is at work: it is the most natural one and it
conﬁrms the basic intuition.
Before turning to the multiplicative case, it is worth showing the link be-
tween the results obtained in this section and those obtained in the previous
one.








Now, if we introduce into (15) the value of q(x∗,ε) and q(b x,ε) found for the













which after obvious simpliﬁcations yields (19).
5 A multiplicative production risk
We now introduce a multiplicative speciﬁcation for the production risk. As



















2)(1 + ε).( 2 0 )
With perfect information, it is easy to show that
x
∗(ρ,ε)=








(1 + ε + ρε + ρε
2)(1 + ε).( 2 1 )








2 + E(e ε
3)(1 + 2ρ)+ρ(E(e ε
4) − σ
4). (22)
This expression has many implications. First, at ρ =0 , ∂V
∂ρ 6=0 , contrarily







2 + E(e ε
3)),
an expression that is positive (see Appendix 1). This means that starting
from ρ =0 , a fall in ρ, i.e. an increase in absolute values, reduces V in the
multiplicative case (while V increases in the additive case). This illustrates
the presence of another eﬀect of ρ on V : in the multiplicative case a negative
correlation stabilizes proﬁts and thus the demand for information on e ε is
reduced. At ρ =0 ,t h i se ﬀect is strong enough in the speciﬁc case to dominate
t h eo t h e ro n el i n k e dt ot h ej o i n ti m p a c to fi n f o r m a t i o n .
Second, from (22) we see that there exists a negative value of ρ such that
∂V
∂ρ is equal to zero, implying that V has a minimum at that point. This
minimum value is obtained at a value ρ such that the right hand side of (22)
is equal to zero, i.e.
ρ =
−(σ2 + E(e ε
3))
σ2 +2 E(e ε
3)+( E(e ε
4) − σ4)
.( 2 3 )
6A similar result could obviously be arrived at by a longer procedure, i.e., compute
E(e π1) and E(e π2),e x p r e s sV as E(e π2)−E(e π1) and then compute ∂V
∂ρ. This is not diﬃcult
but tedious.
9We prove in Appendix 2 that the denominator of ρ is necessarily positive, so
that ρ itself is negative. As a result the relationship between V and ρ in the
multiplicative case is given in ﬁgure 2.
Insert Figure 2
First observe that at ρ =0 ,V is now strictly positive because of the mul-
tiplicative nature of the production risk.7 Besides at ρ =0 , V is increasing
in ρ.
It is important to notice that when ρ is positive and increasing, V is
always increasing. This is because the two eﬀects of ρ on V play in the same
direction: the information on the production risk gives a better information
on the price risk when ρ increases. Besides as the positive ρ increases, the
proﬁtb e c o m e sm o r ev o l a t i l ei nt e r m so fε and this higher volatility stimulates
the value of information. When ρ is negative however, the two forces work
against each other. In fact for a negative ρ,a ni n c r e a s ei nρ in absolute value
stabilizes proﬁts vis à vis ε and this has a depressing eﬀect on V .A tρ = ρ,
the two eﬀects neutralize each other.
While it is obvious from (23) that ρ<0, we still have to wonder if ρ>−1.
When the distribution ofe ε is symmetric, it is the case. Indeed for E(e ε
3) equal
to zero, ρ becomes
ρ =
−σ2




4) >σ 4 for any distribution (see also Appendix 2), it is obvious
that ρ in (24) exceeds −1.
When the distribution of e ε is not symmetric, it may be that V is every-
where increasing in ρ. For instance, suppose thate ε is binary: with probability
2/3 it takes +0.375 and with probability 1/3 it takes −0.75. In this case,
we have σ2 = 9
32,E (e ε
3)=−27
256 and E(e ε
4)= 243
2048 so that ρ = −8
5 .T h u s i n
the range (−1,0) increasing the coeﬃcient of correlation (in absolute value)
decreases the information value.
This example suggests that the stabilizing eﬀect of an increase in ρ when
it is negative can dominate the other eﬀect at all values of ρ between −1 and
zero.
7Remember that for the additive case V =0at ρ =0 .
106C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has considered a risk-neutral agricultural producer who faces
two correlated risks. It has shown a case in which the value of information
about the risk on output always increases with the coeﬃcient of correlation
(in absolute value) between the risks. However, it has also shown a case
in which it may decrease with this coeﬃcient. This example shows that the
eﬀect of a correlation coeﬃcient in a model with multiple risks has not a clear
eﬀect on the value induced by information about one single risk. This may
be thought counter-intuitive. Consider the attitude of an investor facing a
portfolio of assets. One may think a priori that it is more valuable for him to
learn about the distribution of one single asset when these assets are highly-
correlated compared to the case where they are all independent. Indeed high
correlation is one way to learn about the distribution of all assets as opposed
to only learn about the distribution of one asset in the case of independence.
Our paper has suggested that this intuition may not be correct since there
may be a diversiﬁcation eﬀect induced by correlation. This eﬀect may reduce
the overall portfolio risk and thus may reduce the need for information of the
investor.
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12Appendix 1
To prove that σ2 + E(e ε
3) is positive when ε ≥− 1,w ew r i t e
σ















2(1 + ε)dF(ε).( 2 5 )
The second integral on the RHS of (25) is clearly positive and so is the ﬁrst
one because 1+ε exceeds zero on the range (−1,0).
Appendix 2
The two results in this appendix are direct consequences of Jensen’s in-
equality. Because (ε2)2 is striclty convex in ε2 we have
E(e ε
2)








E(e ε(1 +e ε))






























Multiplicative case: Information value V is decreasing in the coeﬃcient
of correlation |ρ| on the range (0,ρ)
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